Playing Large Games Monday, 17 February 2025

Claim: Grie 2-player game R, L E (0,1) nxn, E>0 strategy profile (x\*, y\*) s.t.

 $\forall i, i' \in [n], X_i^* > 0 \Rightarrow (R_y^*)_i \geqslant (R_y^*)_{i'}$ 

the X\* is on E-BR to y\*

Defr. Gives 2-player game 2, ( & (0,1) nxn, & >0,

 $x^{*T} Ry^{*} > (Ry^{*})_{i} - \epsilon + i \epsilon (n)$ 

Strategy profile (x\*, y\*), x\* is an &- best-response

Defin: Given 2-player game R, C & (0,1) xn, E>O,

strategy profile (x\*, y\*) is an E-NE if

 $x^*$  is an  $\varepsilon$ -BR to  $y^*$ , A  $y^*$  is an  $\varepsilon$ -BR to  $x^*$  i.e.,  $x^{*T}Ry^*$   $\geqslant$   $(Ry^*)_i - \varepsilon$  tie [n]  $\forall y^{*T} Cx^{*} \geq (Cx^{*})_{j} - \epsilon \quad \forall j \in [r]$ 

Theorem: Guin 2-player game R, l & (0,1) nxn, & >0  $\exists$  an  $\varepsilon$ -NE  $\hat{x}$ ,  $\hat{y}$  s.t. 1 supp ( $\hat{x}$ ) 1 < 12  $\ln n / \varepsilon^2$ k | Supp  $(\hat{g})$  |  $\leq$  12 m  $n/\epsilon^2$ 

Corollery: Given 2-Player game R.C & (0,1) xm, E >0 an E-NE can be computed in time  $O(n^{24hn/\epsilon^2}poyy(n, 2, c))$ (guess supp ( $\hat{x}$ ), supp ( $\hat{y}$ ), (n) choices for each)

Will use Hoeff ding's inequality: Let X, ..., Xic la independent r.v. s in [0,1]. Let fe= 1 2 Xi. Thu  $\Pr\left[\left|\frac{1}{k}\sum_{i}\chi_{i}-\mathbb{E}\left[\mu\right]\right|>\varepsilon\right]\leq2e^{-2\kappa\varepsilon^{2}}$ 

Proof of Theorem: Let  $(x^*, y^*)$  be a NE. Let  $k = 12 \text{ mn}/\epsilon^2$ . Let A be a multi set of k pure strategies, sampled independently from x\*, & B be a multiset of k pure strategist, sampled Independently from y\*. Let  $\hat{x}$ ,  $\hat{y}$  be the emprical distribution of pure strategies in x\*, i.e., if pre strategy i appears in A,  $\hat{x}_i = x_i / k$ .

Note that :  $|supp(\hat{x})|$ ,  $|supp(\hat{y})| \leq k$ supp (x) C supp (x\*) supp (y\*) We ned to Show:  $\hat{x}$  is  $\epsilon$ -BR to  $\hat{y}$ , &  $\hat{y}$  is  $\epsilon$ -BR to  $\hat{x}$ . Will show:

 $\forall c, \hat{\chi}_c > 0 \Rightarrow (R\hat{g})_c > (R\hat{g})_c - \epsilon$ 

We will show that  $\hat{x}$ ,  $\hat{y}$  is the required  $\epsilon$ - NE.

for K samples Y'... Y' Pr [ ] | \frac{1}{k} \frac{\x'}{\x''} - (\Ry\*)\_i | > \& \lambda /2 ] \leq 2e^{-k\x^2/2} or  $Pr\left[\left|\left(k\hat{y}\right)_{i}-\left(ky^{*}\right)_{i}\right|\right]\leq2e^{-k\epsilon^{2}/2}$ 

Thus w.p.  $1-2ne^{-k\epsilon^2/2}$ ,  $\forall i$ ,  $|(R\hat{y})_i-(Ry^*)_i|\leq \epsilon l_2$ 

Y = Rij w.p. yj

Fix it [n]. Consider r.v. Y s.t.

 $\Rightarrow (2y^*)_{i} > (2y^*)_{i'}$ Thus u.p.  $1-2ne^{-\kappa \epsilon^2/2}$ ,  $\hat{\chi}_i > 0 \Rightarrow (\hat{p}_j)_i \Rightarrow (\hat{p}_y^*)_i - \hat{\epsilon}/2$ > (Ry\*);1 - 2/2

Now consider i: ki >0 => xi >0

> (Rg)i/ - E Similarly, w.g.  $1-4ne^{-k\epsilon^2/2}$ ,  $\hat{y}_i > 0 \Rightarrow (C\hat{x})_i > (C\hat{x})_{i-1} = \epsilon$ . Hence, urp. 1-4ne-12, (x, y) is an E-NE. now  $1-4ne^{-K\epsilon^{2}/2} = 1-4nexp(-\frac{12 \ln n}{\epsilon^{2}} \cdot \frac{\xi^{2}}{2})$ 

 $= 1-4n \cdot \frac{1}{n6} > 0$ Hence,  $\exists \hat{x}, \hat{y}$  s.f.  $|supp(\hat{x})|, |supp(\hat{y})| \leq k$ & x, g is a E-NE.

(This is known as the probabilistic method). Such a strategy is called a k-uniform Strategy, where  $\forall i$ ,  $\hat{x_i} = \frac{\lambda}{L}$ ,  $\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_+$ 

(on show: D | xt Rg - xxt Py\* | ≤ ε 

1) For m players w/ n pure stralegues lech, there I K-uniform strategu ŝ,,..., ŝm for the players s.t.  $|\operatorname{supp}(\hat{s}_i)| \leq k$ ,  $\mathcal{L}(\hat{s}_i) = (\hat{s}_i, \ldots, \hat{s}_m)$  is  $\mathcal{L}(\hat{s}_i) = (\hat{s}_i, \ldots, \hat{s}_m)$ E-NE for E: 3m² ln m²n

in let work. K reduced to 8 lm mn